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The title of the book reveals its answer to this question. Individualism is not justice ; it never has been, it never can be. Individualism is the sacrifice of all equality — in actual practice it becomes even a sacrifice of equality before the law — and a riotous use of the liberty which those possess and abuse who have power to grasp. It does not yield equal liberty. The collectivism in which alone justice can be established is not, however, that Utopian collectivism which is pictured by a Bellamy. It will not be an ideal state of man. As conceived by Mr. Kelly it is rather a means to an end. It is not to be a substitution, at one fell swoop, of socialism for the present order of things. Rather it is to be a practical, experimental, cautious progress, one step at a time, towards a collective ownership by municipalities, commonwealths and nations, of some of the property necessary to the general well-being, and the establishment of a more effective legal or moral control over the remainder.

I have left little space for words of appreciation of the ability with which Mr. Kelly has elaborated the details of his social philosophy. It would be a cheap criticism merely to say that I agree or that I disagree with his conclusions. For this is a book to be read and studied quite irrespective of agreement or disagreement. It abounds in the most concrete, vital knowledge of facts as well as of theories. Mr. Kelly was the founder of the City Club and of the Good Government Club movement in New York City and he knows the inside history of New York reform efforts. His use of this material makes his volumes the most cogent, up-to-date indictment of individualism, as here defined, with which I am acquainted.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

Social Control. A Survey of the Foundations of Order. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1901. — 463 pp.

Professor Ross distinguishes between social control, which is intentional, and social influence, which is without intention ; but he does not confine his treatise strictly to the former. Indeed, it would be difficult to name any department of social psychology which he does not at least touch upon in the course of this volume. And he makes use of much that can scarcely be called either psychology or sociology: the wisdom of ancient and modern philosophy, some of the results of the latest anthropological research and the graceful diction of poetry and belles-lettres are here woven together with a

woof of decided originality into a systematic body—of not demonstrable knowledge exactly, but something that certainly looks scientific as well as philosophical. If at times the style seems in danger of bordering on the pedantic, it is sure to be redeemed by a touch of picturesque slang or a passage of positive, virile writing.

It is so easy to read this well-written, smoothly flowing volume without getting any notion of what it is all about, that the reviewer, to be sure of his ground, must fall back upon the table of contents. Here we find that the work is divided into three parts: "The Grounds of Control," "The Means of Control" and "The System of Control." In the first part, sympathy, sociability and justice—"the 'mothers' to which, Faust-like, we must repair for the secret of natural goodness"—are examined in turn, but found wanting as the supports of a natural order unless supplemented by the dread of resentment or retaliation, that is, "individual reaction." The California mining camps of 1848 are described to illustrate what is meant by "a natural order." The need of social restraints is insisted upon, and the scriptural exhortation regarding beams and motes is shown to be unworkable and fallacious:

If only those were allowed to uphold standards who had demonstrated their ability to live up to them, how our reigning ideals would suffer! . . . For the fact that the rôle of the referee is far easier than that of the principal renders available for social control a vast amount of correct sentiment which is too weak to be effective for self-control.

The "radiant points" of social control are found to be chiefly the elders, the military caste, the priesthood, the wealthy, state officials, learned men, the élite, or "those distinguished by ideas and talent," and the occasional genius; of whom the wealthy, the official and the learned classes are considered as gaining in social power, doubtless at the expense of the other radiant points.

The means of control are shown by the table of contents to be public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion (including education and custom), social religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art, personality, enlightenment, illusion and social valuations. The genesis of ethical elements is found in selection, survival and the superior social insight of great men; the maintenance of these elements is assigned to the dead, and to parents, professional disciplinarians, the selfishly conservative and the ethical élite.

Class control, or "the exercise of power by a parasitic class in its own interest," is distinguished from true social control; but it seems

necessary to concede that when there is sharp conflict of interest, great contrast of means and great inequality of opportunity, society does split up into jarring groups. Changes in social needs or in the culture and habits of a people, the decline of patriotism and public spirit, the loosening of family bonds, the accumulation or borrowing of new knowledge, new experiences, the wholesale acquisition of exotic wants and chronic internecine strife, are some of the other vicissitudes which endanger social control. The instruments of control are mainly ethical or political. They should be economical, internal, simple, spontaneous and diffused.

Professor Ross comes nearest to being practical in his chapter on the limits of social control. Here he lays down certain canons of a rather negative character: each increment of social interference should bring more benefit to persons as members of society than it entails inconvenience to persons as individuals; social interference should not lightly excite against itself the passion for liberty; it should respect the sentiments that are the support of natural order; it should not be so paternal as to check the self-extinction of the morally ill-constituted; it should not so limit the struggle for existence as to nullify the selective process.

The author's statement of his motive in writing this book is hidden away in a footnote in the middle of the last chapter. "It is investigation of the kind I have attempted in this book," he says, "that will enable society to go about the business of control in a scientific way." It is investigation, certainly, but investigation of a somewhat different kind, to which we must look for the development of a science of social control. Political philosophy and social psychology must be verified or replaced by comparative legislation and statistics. The man who advances social control to the status of a science will draw less upon his inner consciousness and the writings of classical philosophers than upon present-day monographs and public documents. The subject is an eminently practical one, and demands a practical treatment. It is because Professor Ross is metaphysical rather than practical that one lays down his book with a feeling of dissatisfaction. His canons are all very well so far as they go, but they will need to be revised and amplified in the light of social experiment.

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